Israel Massacres Protestors; Israel And Press Blames Protestors' "New Tactics"

"Palestinians Test Tactic of Unarmed Mass Resistance"

Palestinian activists are calling it a preview of new tactics to pressure Israel and win world support for statehood: Masses of marchers, galvanized by the Arab Spring and brought together by Facebook, descending on borders and military posts — and daring Israeli soldiers to shoot.

It could prove more problematic for Israel than the suicide bombings and other deadly violence of the past — which the current Palestinian Authority leadership feels only tainted their cause.

After attempted border breaches from Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Gaza left 15 Palestinians dead Sunday, Israeli officials openly puzzled over how to handle an unfamiliar new phase.

"The Palestinians' transition from terrorism and suicide bombings to deliberately unarmed mass demonstrations is a transition that will present us with difficult challenges," said Defense Minister Ehud Barak.

This slanderous nonsense needs to be repudiated and it needs to be repudiated now. Probably 95% of Palestinian resistance or more is non-violent, unarmed, or characterized by mostly symbolic violence such as throwing stones at tanks. If the first intifada received the attention and hosannas that it deserves as the model of Gandhian resistance that it was, then we would never have to hear about how there is "no Palestinian Gandhi" or that the Palestinians have just discovered non-violence. (The Palestinians are perpetually discovering non-violence; according to Ethan Bronner, they had just discovered non-violence some 13 months ago- only 17 years after the first Intifada.) The fact is, Israel and the US media do not want a Palestinian Gandhi. If they did, then the hundreds of Palestinian Gandhis that are doing the slow work in countless Palestinian villages or the other hundreds that are rotting in Israeli prisons (or those that have possibly been shot) would receive the same front-page attention and encouragement that Mohammed Elbaradei is receiving in Egypt. With one caveat: most of those Palestinians that are educated enough to hold the social status of Elbaradei have left the country, as Palestinian civil society has effectively been destroyed by the occupation.

And let's repudiate the Israeli PR claim that these protests caught their security forces off guard, which the above article uncritically regurgitates. There were Palestinian Facebook campaigns promoting an uprising; there are regular non-violent Palestinian protests in which walls or fences are torn down; the Nakba is generally expected to be a time of disorder. The idea that what are likely the best intelligence agencies in the world (either Shin Bet or the Mossad) were caught off guard by all this stretches credulity. More likely, Israel simply didn't care. They just fell back on their default response, honed during the first and the beginning of the second Intifada, their invasion of Lebanon, and their massacre in Gaza: if the Arabs act up, we're going to respond with overwhelming, violent force. "The only thing the Arabs understand is force" has been the battle maxim of Israel since 1948- earlier, in fact. It's because of the press' sole focus on current events and their structural need to spot "trends" that they would think that Israel would act differently in this single, lone instance.

When you read the above headline, don't read it literally. Read it instead as "now that the Palestinian revolts are happening in the context of the Arab revolts, the Israelis are starting to realize that violent repression may be unfavorably compared to that of other regimes in the region, and that this may cause unacceptable damage to their country's public image." The press' staggering revelation that Palestinians indeed protest unarmed may be too late, but if Israel is pressed to muzzle its response to resistance to its occupation, it may not be entirely too little.

Update: Hard to believe that I just read this in The Economist.

Thoughts on the Left and Libya

I don't have a firm position on US and Western intervention in Libya. I'm leaning towards supporting it, and I endorse virtually everything coalition forces are doing and have done so far, but I can't predict the future and I'm not an expert on Libya. (An honest question: can I support was has happened in the past without in some sense supporting what will happen in the future? After all, invasion is the supreme war crime according to Nuremberg Tribunal because all other war crimes are considered to flow from it...)

So I won't pretend to have a stance at the moment. Besides the fact that I live in a congressional democracy and should take some position on the affairs of my country, I'm not a pundit and am under no obligation to offer an opinion.

That said, I've been following the debate on the left between pro-intervention and anti-intervention advocates, the former including Juan Cole and British anarchist Ian Bone and the latter including Chomsky and Alexander Cockburn. One reason that I'm remain uncertain is that each of them, who I often trust to offer me guidance, have written accounts of the intervention that have left me unsatisfied (although Cole's is the best).

I'll start with Chomsky's account. While trying not to succumb to crude utilitarianism, I have to note that Chomsky never offers an opinion about whether or not the Libyan rebels, the Libyans as a whole, or the region will be better off with or without Western intervention- whether the lives of actual human beings will be saved or improved. He posits that a new Libyan government will likely be heavily dependent on Western powers, but his main issues are 1) the illegality of some of the measures taken by the allies and 2) the ulterior motives of the United States.

In regards to 1), Chomsky may be objectively right that the allies violated international law by aiding the rebels rather than simply instrumenting a no-fly zone. But it's a curious argument to make, given that he goes on to say in the same interview that categorically abiding by UN resolutions is to consider "that states are sacrosanct in the form that has been established in the modern world" and accepting that "states are assigned the status of virtually holy entities." Given that Chomsky has sharply disagreed with the UN in the past (on the establishment of a Jewish state, on the invasion of Afghanistan, and presumably on the overthrow of Aristride in Haiti), it feels pedantic even in accordance with even his own views to condemn "participation on the side of the rebels" for violating international law in the face of impending massacres and rebel defeats. Of course a no-fly zone was implemented "on the side of the rebels" (seeing as they lack an air force), and it likely was a tacit go-ahead to the powers involved to begin a more aggressive campaign.

Frankly, I don't really care what realpolitik considerations lead to the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), which is positioning itself as a partial rival to the US, to reject UN 1973. Unless we accept that "states are sacrosanct," then we have to make decisions not solely on the basis of legal and political abstractions but on the basis on concrete realities. In this case, we have to address how our decisions affect real Libyans and the people of the region. Chomsky hardly goes into this, but the actual rebels are asking for our support and the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt are threatened by a Qaddafi victory. We shouldn't become sentimental and lose sight of principles, but these are concrete realities.

As for 2), Chomsky carries out the rather simple exercise of showing that US motives are not altruistic based on his principle that states, as power centers, can only act on their self-interest. Yes, this is about oil and installing a reliable client. But states have often done good things out of their own self-interest; the USSR defeated Nazism, for example. As for the US, we gave relative autonomy to Western Europe and halted North Korean aggression. It's not impossible or inherently contradictory that we could again reconcile self-interest and positive utility. Chomsky, again, addresses the latter but not the former, leaving his account unsatisfactory.

A categorical distrust of Western power also motivates Cockburn. "As always," he writes, "many on the left yearn for an intervention they can finally support and many of them have been murmuring ecstatically, 'This is the one.' Of course the sensible position (mine) simply states that nothing good ever came out of a Western intervention by the major powers, whether humanitarian in proclaimed purpose or not." I'm not sure that even Cockburn accepts this- I imagine he's in favor of the US intervention in Europe to help defeat Nazi Germany- and he certainly hasn't minded intervention by another "major power": the Soviet Union. As he writes in The Golden Age is in Us:

"The Soviet Union defeated Hitler and fascism. Without it, the Cuban Revolution would never have survived, nor the Vietnamese. In the postwar years it was the counterweight to US imperialism and the terminal savageries of the old European colonial powers. It gave support to any country trying to follow an independent line. Without it, just such a relatively independent country as India could instead have taken a far more rightward course. Despite Stalin's suggestion to Mao that he and his comrades settle for only have a country, the Chinese Revolution probably would not have survived either."

So why is it that the US and the West are apparently structurally incapable of providing assistance to a force who wants it, while another superpower, who perpetrated horrors in Afghanistan and Eastern Europe, was able to do so even though it was clearly acting out of its self-interest? (That the USSR "gave support to any country trying to follow an independent line" is appalling bullshit, btw- ask the Czechs or Afghans.) I have to say that this as well as his attempt, along with George Galloway, to paint the mostly working class rebels as Al Qaeda supporters (a claim discredited by Cole) suggests residual Trotskyism of the kind that infects the Anglo-Irish left as well as his inherited yet watered down Stalinism. His citation of a former CIA officer who suggests that support for the revolt would be opposed to American interests seems part and parcel of Cockburn's affiliation with libertarian isolationists. Along with Chomsky, he never makes an argument that intervention would be bad for the rebellion beyond his claim that "that nothing good ever came out of a Western intervention by the major powers," a categorical statement which reeks of his characteristic glibness that recently had him arguing in favor of the hate and conspiracy-mongering Glenn Beck.

Now for the pro-interventionists. Cole and Bone both compare the left's behavior in this situation unfavorably to it's support for the Republicans during the Spanish Civil War. As my friend Kevin put it, "the left used to fight." While Cole's comparison to the left's support for bigoted imperialist Winston Churchill during WWII is more tenable, the comparison to the left's support for the Republicans isn't entirely convincing. Their support was restricted to individually volunteering to fight under Republican leadership, not encouraging a superpower with ulterior motives and an ugly foreign policy record to invade and bomb the place from the sky. Bone's rhetoric in favor of the invasion also suggests too much of his historical hostility to pacifist leftism and not enough serious analysis.

Cole's analysis is more thorough, but it's still flawed. His argument that UN humanitarian intervention wouldn't create a negative precedent is unconvincing in light of the Iraq war (see the last paragraph of the linked article); his contention that this can't be about oil because Western companies already have access to Libyan oil fields under Qaddafi is unsophisticated and repudiated by Chomsky. His contentions that anti-intervention arguments "have the implication that it was all right with the world community if Qaddafi deployed tanks against innocent civilian crowds" and that "if we just don't care if the people of Benghazi are subjected to murder and repression on a vast scale, we aren't people of the left" is moral blackmail and reminds me of the "with us or with them" mentality of the Andrew Sullivan-types from the Bush era. One could be appalled at the treatment of Iraqi Shiites and oppose the Iraq war just as surely as one can be furious with the gunning down of protestors with aircraft while disagreeing with military force for a variety of complex reasons.

Perhaps the main reason that each of these accounts leaves me unsatisfied is that they don't satisfactorily deal with the real consequences Western intervention has for the future of the Libyan people. Cockburn denigrates them by linking many of them to Al Qaeda, Chomsky glosses over them in favor of more abstract principles and political truisms, and Bone and Cole cite concrete benefits of the intervention in the present but ignore the West's spurious record of liberation (see Cuba, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.) that might give clues as to the future.

But I'm leaning towards supporting the intervention because the rebellion- a progressive and largely working class movement- has called for it. I respect their decision. We can't predict the future. Perhaps all we can do is trust the people involved and grant them the ability to direct the future as best they can.

Knowing Thy Enemy and Not Yourself: Why American History Should Be Taught Like Soviet History

"There's a good reason why nobody studies history; it just teaches you too much."- Noam Chomsky

Why don't American schools teach 20th century American history like they teach Soviet history? It's an honest question, based on two propositions: 1) We should, obviously, assess our conduct according to the same standards with which we assess our enemies, if not more harshly, and 2) There are enough similarities between the trajectories of Soviet and 20th century American history that they sometimes seem to even mirror each other (both were societies defined by social engineering projects on an unprecedented scale, both were dominant world powers presiding over the post-war period, both fought the Cold War through the maintenance of regional spheres of influence, etc.). And don't give me any of that "moral equivalency" crap. Soviet domestic conduct may have been far worse than ours, but we topped the Soviets in foreign policy horrors, if only because we had more power than them.

I’m inspired to ask this question based on my public school history education as well as two Oberlin classes, one on Russian history and the other on US foreign policy focusing largely on the Cold War. The first class was solid; the second was bullshit tantamount to indoctrination. The Russian history professor taught with affection for her subject, but she was also sober and unsentimental. The other professor, on the other hand, somehow forgot to mention things like the United States’ control over geographical spheres of influence that encompassed entire subcontinents, continents, and almost the entire Western hemisphere. We somehow avoided or barely discussed Israel, East Timor, Nicaragua, Haiti, Indonesia and Suharto, the IMF, the military-industrial complex, the fake-missile gap, etc. But we did get an entire class devoted largely to the influence of Western culture on the Eastern Europe, how East German kids went batshit for American blue jeans, etc. Otherwise, it was mostly top-down history, reverse Kremlinology, court stenography describing in tedious detail how The Best and the Brightest dueled with the Soviets amidst the fog of war.

I'll tell a revealing anecdote: during a class discussion comparing Soviet and American conduct during the Cold War, I said that I saw no substantial moral difference in the way that Americans treated their clients (Guatemala) and the way that the Soviet Union treated theirs (North Korea). To which the professor responded as a challenge: would I rather live in Western or Eastern Europe during the Cold War? Unprepared, I fumbled my answer and embarrassed myself, but the retort should have been immediate and obvious: would I rather live in Eastern Europe or Nicaragua, Chile, El Salvador, etc.? The idea that Our policies were comparable to Theirs was just not even entertained by him. And as Norman Finkelstein pointed out, when history is not subject to comparison, it becomes a totem to be worshipped at rather than understood.

If we taught American history like we teach Soviet history- that is, if we gave similar weight to issues in American history that we do to similar issues in Soviet history - we would actually confront major issues such as the termination of Arab nationalism, the destruction of Indochina (our class only discussed Vietnam and possibly Cambodia, amazingly, even though those invasions were only part of a war on the entirety of Southeast Asia), and general attempts by the US to prevent third world countries across the world from fully realizing the decolonization granted to them by World War II.

And that's just foreign policy. Below are other issues common to both Soviet history and 20th century American history. We discuss these issues as a matter of course when studying Soviet history, but we don't even know that these are issues in American history. The following list is almost certainly incomplete:

Soviet propaganda vs. American propaganda: American corporate and state propaganda was much more prevalent than Soviet propaganda and the propaganda of any other nation, as Alex Carey discusses. (This is partly a credit to the United States; it was a free enough country that the government could not use force to control people except under more extreme circumstances and had to resort to propaganda instead.) This includes corporate propaganda against unions and big society programs, war propaganda, Democrat and Republican campaign management by public relations firms, media propaganda produced in accordance with Chomsky's "propaganda model," and advertising- the latter openly referred to before World War II as propaganda.

Yet while Soviet propaganda is reflexively and correctly described as such, American propaganda is euphemistically referred to as advertising, campaign rhetoric, PR, talking points, or is simply normalized and thus dismissed as being a natural part of politics. A Soviet-approach to American history would've exposed Obama's "Hope" and "Change" slogans as propaganda and would allow us to be more critical of the commercial advertising that permeates our society- initially designed quite consciously to control mass behavior (see Adam Curtis's excellent documentary The Century of the Self).

The Soviet Gulag vs. The Golden Gulag: The Soviet gulags might beat out American prisons in terms of horror and brutality (despite consistent rape and torture in American prisons), but America wins this contest in terms of scale. As Ruth Wilson Gilmore describes in Golden Gulag: Prison, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California, the prison construction program America embarked on in the 80s was the largest of its kind in history, built not for existing criminals, but in anticipation of the criminals that would emerge as a predictable byproduct of draconian drug laws and Reagan’s neoliberal order. None of my history classes taught this. They never told us that the US has the highest incarceration rate in the world. But we were assigned Solzhenitsyn in a high school English class and read about their prisons. I suppose that was supposed to be more edifying then learning about our own.

The KGB vs. the FBI and COINTELPRO: No contest here: the KGB was, of course, worse than the FBI. Nevertheless, while it's household knowledge that the KGB disappeared innumerable Russians, operations like COINTELPRO, an FBI program of surveillance and disruption that included political assassination, is virtually unheard of in this country. As Chomsky points out in this interview, we were all made well aware of Watergate but not of COINTELPRO, in spite of the fact that the latter was overwhelmingly more significant for having actual consequences (sometimes fatal) for those who were under surveillance. We're also unaware of the FBI's use of RICO against groups like the Black Panthers, as described by Christian Parenti. We know that the KGB was the USSR's political police; we don't even know that we have a political police, or that it waged a covert campaign against members of its own population.

Students can’t be taught this. They would be confronted with the demoralizing rapidity and totality with which rebellions, even minor ones such as the Black Panther revolts, are crushed in American history; they would suspect that even American political power ultimately rests on violence; and they would define the 60s not by the patronizing version of Martin Luther King that’s spoon-fed to them but by the milieu of communist, black nationalist, militant, and radical student groups that represented an almost wholesale revolt against society as it was.

Soviet social engineering projects vs. American social engineering projects: Besides their foreign policies, this is the most significant similarity between the US and the USSR. Their social engineering projects include the dissemination of propaganda and the mass building of prisons described above. For America, they also include projects such as the National Highway Act (far and away the largest social engineering project in human history), suburbanization, the G.I. bill, military infiltration into American higher education, the New Deal and the Great Society (which are discussed, but not as social engineering projects), NAFTA, etc. Not to mention Pentagon spending, which, as Alexander Cockburn described it, is "the fundamental ballast" to the American economy. (I also doubt that American economics courses teach this.) Many of these programs are larger in scale than anything in Stalin's Five Year Plan- yet we don't even know that there were social engineering projects in this country, much less their details.

As I wrote earlier: "Imagine being a Russian student and never learning about the Five Year Plan or a Chinese student never learning about The Great Leap Forward (and the parallels of the US to these massive state-controlled behemoths are frequent and often unflattering), and you're beginning to get a sense at how fucking stupid American education is." But imagine if we were taught about these things: we would see that our common destiny does not unfold according to deterministic market logic that exists over and above human control as something holy, but is to a great extent shaped by an identifiable elite who can be targeted and then challenged. And- this might be the best part- knowledge of how much of America's progress is due to social engineering (including slavery and the genocide of the Native Americans) would hopefully dispel that obnoxious trope that "free market capitalism is what made this country great" and other Tea Party bullshit.

Afghanistan vs. Vietnam: Both conflicts are discussed- Americans did die in Vietnam, making it worthy of attention in American history classes in the way that East Timor is not- but they’re discussed differently. The Russian history professor never once took seriously the official Soviet claim that the invasion of Afghanistan was undertaken to defend the Afghan people from “agents of western reaction.” Rather, our primary text dealing with Afghanistan and the USSR’s resulting collapse was written by a New Republic liberal who spoke in the refreshing language of realpolitik (as we always do when discussing enemy nations): the Soviets invaded to crush an uprising and thereby send a warning to its other constitutive territories not to attempt secession and disintegrate the union.

Official propaganda, on the other hand, was taken at face value in our discussions of Vietnam: we invaded- sorry, we intervened- in South Vietnam to contain communist expansion and win the Cold War. Never mind that the NLF was a purely nationalist group at it’s outset and only became Stalinist and aligned with the Soviet Union when western forces made such an alliance necessary for self-defense. But the official explanation justifies what I think most students intuitively understand was an evil as a defense against a greater evil. Teaching that American policy by its nature always acts in accordance with some objective moral standard is a form of religious initiation, not education.

My Russian and American history courses did share flaws: many American academics seem too hesitant to intimately examine societal dynamics and the power bases of dominant groups- to approach education as sociology, as Theodor Adorno put it- out of fear that such analysis would be pigeonholed as “Marxist.” For example, we didn’t assess class in either course beyond discussion of the Kulaks and Russian peasants. But when scholars of Russia note a major event or overarching historical theme in their studies, they actually talk about it with their students, if sometimes superficially. Given that so many of the major events and overarching themes in American history are so similar to those of Soviet history (and should be much more important, give that we’re Americans), the only plausible explanation for the unique academic silence concerning them must be ideological. Underneath all the academic prestige, this is ultimately nothing more complicated than rooting for the team.

About That Lull...

I know that I don't have a lot of readers, but I'd figure I'd explain to you all why I haven't posted in so long.

In a nutshell, I've been doing a bit of rethinking, and a lot of my opinions, especially those about Oberlin and the higher education system in general, no longer seen entirely tenable. I still think that there are a lot of truth in my posts dealing with those issues, but they ignore or minimize what should be central facts: that colleges like Oberlin are some of the few places in the US where there is a real civil society- that is to say, a society in people spontaneously and constructively interact with each other more or less as equals - and that I'm very privileged to have attended one of them on my parents' dime rather then being forced to get a crappy job like most people in the world. I wrote these posts when I was in a bad state, and I think that some amount of projection was involved in writing them. Not to mention that the "We Are Oberlin" piece was self-pitying, humorless, and lacked self-reflection- a deadly combination. Again, there are certainly real cultural and structural problems with Oberlin and higher education, but they have to be balanced against the real benefits they provide.

I'm reconsidering all this due primarily to a recent post-graduation visit to Oberlin to see my girlfriend. I stayed in her dorm, called Harkness, which works as a sort of hippie-ish commune: the people there live, eat, cook, and clean together. It was the best argument for socialism or communism that I've encountered, better that any of the learned but abstract arguments I've read from Chomsky. It existed within a capitalist framework (although as I've noted earlier, colleges have pre-capitalist roots that survive despite their corporatization), but it worked communistically. It functioned. And quite unlike most capitalist institutions, it not only functioned but functioned joyously. The times that I fulfilled my obligation to help cook and clean were one of the few times that I actually felt like doing any work in my life. And the Hark hippies (to the extent that I can broadly label them as such) weren't the complacent hippies that the punks rebelled against, but were often active in a number of causes, like resisting mountaintop removal. They're not just lifestyle socialists. Not to mention that they were fun, intelligent, and interesting people. They weren't humorless leftie cliches.

I'm gushing with this point in mind: that Oberlin allows this place and other similar places to exist. The above qualities are not confined to Harkness: Oberlin allows students to explore different identities, lifestyles, and ideas (though it doesn't necessarily allow them to fully act on their implications) before the pressure of the working world smothers their creativity. Harkness was idyllic to me. Forget that it exists due to the patronage of a capitalist society which is it's backdrop, that it functions in a somewhat carceral manner like all college dorms and colleges as a whole, and that it's occasional tweeness and preciousness implicates it in the general insularity and decadence of the greater liberal class. Forget the context that Harkness exists in, in other words, just for a minute, and you can deeply appreciate it for the intimate, loving community that it is.

I have to thank Harkness first and foremost for the great time that I had, but I also have to thank Oberlin for allowing Harkness to exist, even if too much of Oberlin is embarrassed and resentful of it. My shift in this particular opinion has made me uncertain of others; hence I've been hesitant to commit any viewpoints for publication.

So, that's out of the way. This isn't a complete renunciation of past views, but some credit was due. Back to more bile, hopefully soon.

Grape Interview About Mental Health at Oberlin

“Oberlin, to me, is about stress,” a former psychologist of mine from the counseling center once told me. No one has since expressed this basic fact to me as plainly. As Oberlin heads into finals, Oberlin is certainly defined by stress more than anything, yet this stress is only discussed indirectly—most recent conversations I’ve had revolve around grueling workloads, but the insane amount of stress everyone experiences is accepted as a given. Mental health issues such as anxiety and depression are largely normalized as part of the college experience.

In fact, mental health issues on campus have increased and may recently have literally reached crisis levels. According to Harvard clinician Richard Kadison,in his 2004 book College of the Overwhelmed: The Campus Mental Health Crisis and What to Do About It, there has been a "mental health crisis" on college campuses since the late ‘80s. "Since 1988, the likelihood of a college student suffering depression has doubled, suicidal ideation has tripled, and sexual assaults have quadrupled," he writes. “It is the elephant in the room that no one it talking about.”

Oberlin, as a small campus, may be particular susceptible to this mental health crisis. Charlie Ross, the director of the Oberlin counseling center, said that last year the center, “saw 640 students, which is about 22 percent (of the student population). Compared to the schools like us, like Mt. Holyoke, Wesleyan, Amherst, it’s a pretty similar number. Nationally, it’s 11 percent”

“We do have an increase in urgency that students express in getting counseling.” Ross said. “We have what’s called a crisis walk-in everyday. And it used to be that we would have one person or maybe nobody waiting for an appointment. But it turned out that two or three years ago we would have six or eight people come to a walk-in. So it drastically in a year it changed from none to maybe two people to maybe six or eight people.”

Fortunately, Active Minds, a nationwide organization that is devoted to changing “the conversation about mental health on college campuses,” has established a chapter at Oberlin that can help provoke discussion of these kind of issues. I interviewed Oberlin Active Minds member Jamie Flynn about Active Minds, stress, and how we talk about mental health on campus.

Can you give a description of Active Minds?

Active Minds at Oberlin is a chapter of a nationwide organization founded by Alison Malmon after her brother committed suicide as a way to promote an open dialogue about mental health issues on college campuses. Her main goal in doing this, and our mission, was to educate the public and advertise mental health resources so that people can get help before they end up in crisis.

As an Oberlin College student organization, we work to remove stigma from the people who live with (mental health issues), and the discussion surrounding mental disorders through education and programming. As a local chapter, we are working with the student voice to promote healthy changes in the dialogue about mental health on Oberlin campus. If you can’t talk about how to be mentally healthy, how will anyone be able to discuss living with mental illness? Also, we're a fun group. Everyone should come check us out.

How would you describe the stress/mental health situation at Oberlin?

"Stress" is a ubiquitous state of mind that peaks during finals. I don't think that I have met a single person at Oberlin during the academic school year that has not experienced an alarming degree of stress at some point or another. That is where the mental health component of Oberlin's resources come in. Since I began as a first-year, organizations like the counseling center and the center for leadership in health promotion have tried to introduce programming to help students reduce their stress like massages and puppy therapy to name two. While definitely an improvement, I feel that these programs have also encouraged students to think of stress-reducing measures as time-consuming and out-of-the-way.

Furthermore, I think that the mentality surrounding stress is something like "if you don't have a lot of it, you're not doing it (Oberlin/school) right." In reality, simple steps like making sure you get enough sleep, eating right, and time management are the best ways to reduce stress and maintain healthy mental states. I do not think people talk about these things for fear of sounding "boring" or "lame." Who wants to sleep at 1 AM when there's a party on campus or a paper due?

What do you think causes stress at Oberlin? Overwork, social issues, other causes?

I think expectations cause stress at Oberlin. Expectations of a movie-typical college lifestyle that Oberlin's campus may not actually support, expectations of academic excellence, expectations of social excellence, etc. all seem to contribute to stress at Oberlin, and they all seem to be built into its very image. I think Oberlin has a body image problem much like a person with an eating disorder. So yes, all of those things mentioned do cause stress, but only as they are interpreted by each individual in accordance with their expectations.

How would you assess the mental health facilities and programs at Oberlin? Maybe include something along the lines of what you were saying on how they need to integrate into the community more.

I think that the mental health facilities available to Oberlin students are adequate, but operating under their potential. Most of the wellness-centered organizations on campus are incommunicado, at least to each other. To try and rectify this, the college has done some re-organization to introduce a dialogue between the counseling center and the physical education staff in Phillips, for example. It's really very exciting because we are working towards a time when a student can receive coordinated and comprehensive relief from multiple sources on campus that already exist.

What do you think are some possible solutions are to stress/mental health issues on campus?

I think the only real solution is to change peoples' perspectives on things like sleeping and eating. Most (I would venture to say) would put work and other activities before sleep and nutrition when the fact of the matter is that those two mundane activities will make students more attentive in class and efficient in homework performace. However, to begin that revolution the campus needs to be able to openly discuss what it means to be mentally healthy as well as unhealthy. An open and equal conversation about mental health, good and bad, is the only way for Oberlin to encourage students to prepare themselves for a healthy as well as academically and/or fiscally successful life.

Active Minds, as an organization, is trying to promote programming and increase the educational resources on campus having to do with living with mental illness and living a mentally healthy lifestyle. Our resource panel, an event that gathered the many wellness resources on campus into one room to give student a better idea of what is available on campus, was hugely successful and is being sponsored by OBFit this year.

College Made Me Stupider

College made me stupider. Or at least the classes I took at college made me stupider. In the time I took passively absorbing and regurgitating information, I could have doing what I wanted to do. I could have learned through doing things with other people, or studied what I wanted to study. It’s called self-directed or collaborative learning, and it’s about the only way anyone truly learns anything. College workloads discourage self-directed and collaborative learning. Hence, I am now slightly dumber than I would have been had I not gone to school and had spent the tuition money on something else.

I think that, deep down, we all understand this. Think a little bit, and you’ll realize that you learned about the things you’re truly interested in outside of class. Same goes with most of the people you know. The only exceptions are the budding young academics I'm friends with- all three of them. You really only learn how to be an academic here, since all you're doing is academic work. You naturally internalize the lifestyle, the manner of thinking and acting. College is an institution that, like all institutions, is built to sustain itself: it trains people to be academics so they can then go on to train other young people to be academics. No wonder the market is flooded with wretched graduate students who can’t find an academic job.

It’s not as though I learned nothing here- but it would be remarkable if I did anything for four years and learned nothing. The difference is that I paid $2oo,ooo for these particular four years. While I did learn a few scattered things about philosophy (my major), I don’t have any profound or cohesive understanding of the subject. I can barely apply any of the philosophy I learned here to my own understanding of the world, which is the real value of knowledge. After four years at this college, I have a profound understanding only of what’s wrong with it. I wonder if that was worth $200,000.

Of course it wasn’t, which suggests to me that school is about something else- namely, showing to employers that you’re willing to take orders for four more years. And not only that, you’re willing to pay to take orders. It’s funny when you think about it. Usually, if you’re taking orders from someone, they’re at least paying you; here, it’s the opposite. But college is about landing a job. Students understand this.

"The most commonly mentioned reasons to go to college included getting career training, getting a better job, and making more money" the journalist David Kirp writes in his overview of the corporate college, Shakespeare, Einstein, and The Bottom Line. Or, more broadly, as the sociologist Mitchell Stevens wrote in his book Creating a Class, higher education is another step in the factory process of "social reproduction" which "systematically favors the wealthy, well-educated, and well-connected." This is so obvious as to be almost intuitive. Only in self-congratulatory college propaganda is school centrally about learning or “intellectual autonomy” or whatever.

As Hunter Thompson might say, “there’s something seriously bent” about heading off into the middle of Ohio to submerge oneself in a neo-feudal model of subservience to a covenant of learned priests. It’s even odder to want to pay $200,000 for it. But the kind of person who’s able to make it into an elite institution like Oberlin is usually the kind of person who would pay that $200,000, because that kind of person has been taking orders his or her whole life. We did every idiotic thing our public school teachers told us to do and went through the same grueling process of selling ourselves ("the admissions process").

Noam Chomsky describes it as a trial by idiocy: "People are filtered out for obedience. If you can guarantee lots of stupidity in the educational system, you know that the only people who will make it through are people like me who are willing to do it no matter how stupid it is because we want to go to the next step." Oberlin may have crowned itself as an eternally electic, left of center college, but most of its students are bred though stupidity to obey. We would otherwise not have made it this far. It cannot be otherwise.

This basic fact explains Oberlin. There’s a reason we’re defined by awkwardness: anyone who could deny their own feelings for their whole life is bound to be something of an emotional cripple. If there is such a thing as emotional intelligence, than many Oberlin students (including and especially myself) are emotional idiots as surely as the kids in the stupid class back in our high schools were academic idiots. William Deresiewicz, a former Yale professor, described this phenomenon as “Ivy retardation”:

I also never learned that there are smart people who aren’t “smart.” The existence of multiple forms of intelligence has become a commonplace, but however much elite universities like to sprinkle their incoming classes with a few actors or violinists, they select for and develop one form of intelligence: the analytic…. Social intelligence and emotional intelligence and creative ability, to name just three other forms, are not distributed preferentially among the educational elite. The “best” are the brightest only in one narrow sense.

This intellectual disparity helps explain why the much of the arts here are so careful and academic (and thus completely useless), why the dating scene is pathetic, and why life at Oberlin is often flat and uninteresting. The reason is simple: it's long been understood that obedience to authority is anathema to spontaneity and communal interaction (as well as, it should be mentioned, true learning). But “we came here to study”, right?

Much of college is useless beyond career advancement, but there are exceptions. The sciences are real academic subjects that can be taught successfully in schools; unlike the "social sciences" and the arts, they truly are a specialized form of knowledge that can only be learned in a rigorous setting under established authorities. And, as opposed to most of America, people actually do things at a college. Colleges, because of their pre-capitalist roots, have some kind of autonomy relative to the outside world that does allow for some kind of community. Oberlin’s civil society may be withering and of little consequence, but at least it exists.

But otherwise, while Oberlin may be "a good school", it remains a school. It's problems are mostly inherent. I certainly won't miss it. Or at least I hope I won't. Imagine if the rest of the world is miserable enough that I actually would...

We Hate Ourselves More Than We Hate Rove

The strangest thing about this Karl Rove visit is how liberals at Oberlin clearly hated the protestors more than they hated Rove. It shouldn't be a contest: on the one hand, you had a professional (and knowing) slanderer and propagandist for the most reactionary American administration in at least 60 years; on the other, you had people whose worst crime would be to disrupt a mediocre speech by a man's who's mediocre in all respects except in his cruelty and lack of scruples. (He's not a "political genius," guys. The regurgitation of this piece of pure media hype proves that Oberlin has, if nothing else, successfully cultivated the next generation of Time magazine reporters.)

Yet the hate isn't directed at the bad guy; rather, it's directed at the people who want to fight him- even though we all may hate Rove, at least in theory. And any excuse, no matter how presumptuous, is good enough for the hate. The protests won't be effective, Rove won't care, we're just a bunch of whiny college students, we’re spoiled, a protest would be self-congratulatory, etc. All these excuses don't even come close to explaining the sheer amount of abuse the protestors received.

Which convince me that the real reason for the hate-fest can be best explained by an article about liberal hatred toward Michael Moore, written years ago by John Dolan at the brilliant The eXile:

"You hate Moore because he's likely to drag you into a streetfight. That's what happened at the Oscars: Moore took the podium and used it as a weapon. He bludgeoned Bush with that Oscar, right there in front of everyone, until the crowd booed him off. And they didn't boo him because they were "conservatives," either. I'd bet that the loudest booers were classic H-wood liberals. They booed because when Moore started fighting, they felt ashamed, then angry -- because in some vestigial corner of their minds, they knew they should have been standing with him.

"As a lifelong coward, I know the feeling, the shame of watching someone fight your fight for you--and I know that it's not your tormentors you hate most. No, it's your champion, your damned officious champion, whose courage only throws your cowardice into relief, that you hate most--after yourself."

But the excuses were interesting for being revealing. Take the “protests won’t be effective” argument. It was the argument the anti-protestors made the most; it also happened to be exactly false. About the only time colleges make the news at all these days is when there are student protests against prominent figures who are invited to speak at them.

Professor Steve Volk tacitly acknowledged the effectiveness of protest in a letter that encouraged student to observe decorum during the Rove speech. He listed Chris Hedges and Michael Oren as notable examples of people who were famously disrupted during their speeches. Other examples that ring out are the protests against Ehud Olmert at the University of Chicago and even a rather impressive protest against that indefatigable idiot Martin Peretz when he spoke at Harvard. This means Harvard activists upstaged us, and for a significantly less repulsive figure. Can we please stop promoting that obnoxiously self-aggrandizing “oh, we’re just so darn radical at Oberlin” cliché now?

And I’m willing to bet that some of the same people who directed spite at the Rove protestors watched or could watch some of the above examples on Youtube with glee. And we all enjoyed the video of the Iraqi journalist throwing his shoes at George Bush or of the student who pied Thomas Friedman. It’s only when such protests effect us that they suddenly become despicable.

Of course, the protestors share the blame in all this. Campus activism- real campus activism, the kind that has acted on the remarkable pretense that Oberlin is a community and could thus unite around certain causes- has emerged from hiding a few times since I’ve been a student here. The Coalition was an example; the Karl Rove Is Coming activists are another. And each treated politics as though it were a grim duty, our dubious birthright as privileged Oberlin students. The Coalition argued that we were spoiled and ignorant of racial issues, necessitating immediate reeducation. The Karl Rove is Coming protestors, on the other hand, argued that it was our responsibility to protest Rove so that we could vindicate our reputation as a liberal campus.

On this, the protestors and the anti-protestors were united: it was our duty to the school to either make a ruckus or to sit quietly to show that we were either liberal or tolerant enough to honor the school’s image. It was typical self-deprecating Oberlin politics on a slightly grander scale; eating out of dumpsters and not showering to conserve water expanded into political theatre.

What everyone seemed to miss is that protesting Karl Rove could be fun. Not fun in a cute, Harkness sort of way, but in a righteous and invigorating way. Imagine the spectacle of hundreds of students, unapologetic in their noble hatred for Karl Rove, directing a furious and joyous tide of boos at that repulsive pig- because we could, and because we wanted to. As everyone knew (deep down, at least), that kind of bold display would become Oberlin legend and would have an effect both in and outside of the campus- which is the real reason that people hated the protestors.

We’re too spoiled and lucky to be able to go to such a venerable institution to allow ourselves any joy or collective gratification. The reputation of the school was paramount, however false that reputation actually is. And the same crippling deference that defines this wretched campus scored another victory. On that note, I should add that I didn’t go to the speech/ protest. Maybe it was because I was too busy, or because I never got around to buying a ticket- or maybe because, “in some vestigial corner” of my mind, I was afraid.